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Abstract This study considers whether auctioned properties sell for
different prices than they would bring through private
negotiation. After reviewing the procedural aspects of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development auctions, we
compare the observed prices of properties sold at one such
auction with predicted market values based on assessment ratios
for the region to detect any discount or premium. We also
consider whether the order of sale of the auctioned properties
affects observed prices. We ﬁnd that sample properties sell at a
signiﬁcant discount relative to predicted market values and that
prices tend to increase as the auction proceeds, holding quality
of the properties constant.
‘‘You mean, I won? Now what do I do?’’
Comment overheard from a winning bidder at a recent HUD home auction in
Florida.
 Introduction
To some people, the mention of the phrase ‘‘real estate auction’’ brings to mind
fantastic opportunities to purchase properties at deep discounts to their true value.
Presumably, properties that appear on the auction block are those that must be
sold quickly due to some urgency on the part of the current owner. The perceived
urgency associated with the auction concept may lead to the notion that auctioned
properties sell for lower prices than they would otherwise bring through more
traditional market mechanisms. This study analyzes auction prices and compares
them with predicted market values that might be obtained through private
negotiations.
The auction mechanism is a frequent research topic, perhaps because auctions,
especially those in the English format with oral ascending bids, provide
researchers with a ﬁrst-hand opportunity to observe the price formation process.
In an early study on the theory of auctions, Vickrey (1961) discusses some rather
strong assumptions that must hold to ensure that the auction mechanism results280  Allen and Swisher
in the same price as a non-auction transaction. Subsequently, numerous researchers
have considered price formation in auctions in which one or more of Vickrey’s
assumptions are relaxed. Reviews of this literature are found in McAfee and
McMillan (1986) and Wilson (1992).
In recent years, auction research has focused on the microstructure of the price
formation process. Studies by Ashenfelter (1989), Ashenfelter and Genesove
(1992) and De Boer, Conrad and McNamara (1992), for example, question
whether prices of similar items sold in a sequential auction are affected by the
order of sale. In other words, are prices systematically higher or lower at the
beginning of the auction than they are near the end of the auction, holding other
things constant? If the answer is yes, then the expected revenue of an auction may
be impacted by the ordering of the assets on the auction block.
Lusht (1994) addresses this issue with respect to real estate auctions using a
sample of Australian branch bank properties that were sold at auction in 1988.
He ﬁnds that prices for the auctioned properties exhibited a signiﬁcant decline as
the auction proceeded, even after accounting for quality differences in the
auctioned properties.
More recently, Mayer (1998) examines the relationship between auction prices
and predicted sales prices (based on a repeat sales index). Conﬁrming his earlier
work (Mayer, 1994), Mayer ﬁnds that auctions sell property at a discount, which
increases in down markets. Furthermore, he ﬁnds that the discount is larger in
‘‘scattered-site auctions’’ than in auctions involving single-site (condominium)
properties. Mayer’s study ﬁnds no evidence of the declining price anomaly.
The objective of this study is to extend the research regarding the auction price
formation process through empirical analysis of transaction prices from a recent
auction held on behalf of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). We compare transaction prices from this auction with predicted market
values of the auctioned properties calculated using mean assessment ratios for the
regions in which the properties are located. The evidence demonstrates that auction
prices exhibit discounts relative to predicted market values that vary across
subsamples of the data. We then investigate the relationship between sequential
order and auction price, holding quality constant, and document that order of sale
may indeed impact auction prices. In contrast to the results reported by Lusht
(1994) and Mayer (1998), however, we ﬁnd that prices, after controlling for value,
tend to increase as the auction proceeds. We hypothesize that this positive relation
between price and order may be attributable to increased aggression (or perhaps
desperation) on the part of bidders who see their opportunity to ﬁnd a bargain
slipping away as the auction proceeds.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section describes
the mechanics of a HUD home auction held in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, including
details about the quality of legal title conveyed by HUD to purchasers, buyers’
obligation to inspect the properties before the auction date, real estate agents’ rolePrice Formation Process at a HUD Auction  281
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in the auction process, earnest money requirements and closing arrangements. The
following section presents a comparison of transaction prices from this auction
with independent estimates of the value of the auctioned properties to detect any
systematic price discounts or premiums. This section also describes the methods
used to examine any relationship between transaction price and the order of
auction, holding quality of the auctioned items constant. The results of this
analysis conﬁrm that order of sale may indeed be a signiﬁcant price factor, with
prices rising as the auction proceeds. The ﬁnal section is the conclusion.
 The Mechanics of a HUD Home Auction
As a result of foreclosure, HUD frequently comes into ownership and possession
of properties that were pledged as collateral for FHA-insured mortgage loans.
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance is a program in which the
borrower purchases insurance that protects the lender in the event that the borrower
defaults on the obligation to repay the debt. If the borrower defaults on a FHA-
insured loan and the lender acquires title to the property through the foreclosure
process, the lender then ﬁles a claim with the FHA for reimbursement of any
losses and simultaneously conveys title to the property to HUD. HUD then
endeavors to sell the property to recover as much of the claim as possible by
listing the property with a HUD-afﬁliated real estate broker in the local area.
When a sufﬁcient inventory of unsold properties accumulates in a given
geographic area, HUD may arrange for an independent auctioneer to conduct a
public auction of the properties. The frequency of HUD auctions around the
country depends on the rate of default on FHA-insured loans that result in lenders
acquiring title to the mortgaged properties through foreclosure and local market
conditions that may inhibit the sale of the property through the traditional listing
arrangement with a HUD-afﬁliated real estate broker.
On July 10 and 11, 1998, an auction for single-family homes owned by HUD in
south Florida was conducted in Fort Lauderdale, Florida at the Radisson Bahia
Mar Resort Hotel. The auction began at noon on each of the two days and
continued for approximately two hours until the last property on the block for that
day was sold. The auction was organized by Larry Lathem Auctioneers, a
professional auction company headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona. Each of the
properties offered at the auction was sold to the highest bidder. On the ﬁrst day
of auction, seventy-one properties located in Broward and Palm Beach Counties
were sold. On the second day, ninety-nine properties located in Miami-Dade
County and various counties along the southwestern coast of Florida were sold.
Prior to the auction date, the auctioneer advertised the event to the public by direct
mail, newspaper advertisements and the Internet to attract bidders to the auction.
A list of properties to be auctioned was provided to the public in advance of the
auction date, and potential bidders were encouraged to visit and inspect the
properties prior to the auction and to attend a buyer’s awareness seminar. At the282  Allen and Swisher
seminar, the auctioneer informed the potential bidders of the following general
facts regarding HUD auctions.
Properties sold at HUD home auctions are delivered to the buyer with clear title.
All liens and other encumbrances of record are eliminated through the foreclosure
process before HUD accepts title. The title conveyed by HUD to winning bidders
is considered ‘‘good and marketable,’’ though buyers may purchase title insurance
for additional protection from undiscovered defects in the title.
All auction sales by HUD are ﬁnal and all homes are sold on an ‘‘as is’’ basis.
No sales are contingent on the buyer’s inspection of the property. Because many
of the properties owned by HUD are in less than pristine condition, HUD
sometimes sets aside escrow funds to cover the estimated cost of anticipated
repairs. Information about the amount (if any) of repair escrow funds available
for each property on the auction list is provided to potential buyers. The escrow
funds are only available to owner-occupants using FHA-insured ﬁnancing. Any
excess funds remaining in escrow after repairs are completed will be applied to
the principal balance, and any cost overages must be borne by the buyer. Investors
and owner-occupants using cash or non-FHA ﬁnancing are not eligible to receive
the repair escrow funds.
HUD discloses whether the property is eligible for FHA-insured ﬁnancing,
whether the property was built before 1978 (an indicator of potential lead-based
paint on the premises) and whether the property is located in a ﬂood zone. No
disclosures or guarantees are made regarding potential code or zoning violations.
To facilitate potential bidders’ inspection of the homes on the auction list prior to
the auction date, local real estate agents who wish to represent potential purchasers
are encouraged to register with HUD prior to the auction and are given a pass
key, which permits interior access to all of the homes on the auction list. Real
estate agents representing a winning bidder at the auction are entitled to a 3%
commission, payable by HUD upon closing. If an agent buys a property for his/
her own account, no commission is paid to the agent. The purchaser is not entitled
to a discount if the services of a real estate agent are not used.
To register as a bidder at a HUD home auction, potential purchasers must prove
that they have either sufﬁcient cash to complete the purchase or have a letter of
pre-approved credit from a HUD-approved lender. In addition, all bidders are
required to have cash or a cashier’s check for $2,000 as earnest money for each
property the bidder intends to buy. Unless HUD grants an extension, earnest
money is forfeited if the purchaser fails to close on the property within the time
limit discussed below. Inability to obtain ﬁnancing results in forfeiture of the
earnest money.
Because clear title is immediately available and because the properties are sold in
‘‘as is’’ condition, HUD requires that transactions close within thirty days of the
auction date. Closings are arranged by a designated HUD closing agent. HUD
pays the closing agent’s fee, deed preparation costs and other closing costsPrice Formation Process at a HUD Auction  283
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customarily paid by the seller up to 3% of the purchase price. Real estate taxes,
water and sewer charges, etc. are prorated to the date of the closing.
An incentive program is available to encourage purchasers to close their
transactions within ﬁfteen days of the auction. For properties with auction prices
above (below) $25,000 HUD provides a cash rebate of $900 ($450) if the closing
occurs within ﬁfteen days. The rebate is divided equally between the lender and
the real estate agent (if both are used). If no lender is used, the purchaser may
collect the lender’s portion. If no real estate agent is used, HUD retains the agent’s
share of the rebate.
The earnest money deposit of $2,000 is payable at the auction, with the full
balance of the purchase price due on closing. If the purchaser is using a FHA-
insured loan to fund the transaction, HUD imposes strict downpayment limits. For
owner-occupants, the minimum downpayment is 3% of the purchase price. For
investors, the minimum downpayment required for a single-family property is 25%
of the purchase price. If the purchaser is not using a FHA-insured loan, the
downpayment requirements depend on the loan terms negotiated between the
lender and the borrower.
Although the details provided here pertain to a speciﬁc HUD auction held in
Florida, the arrangements are similar to those employed at other HUD auctions.
Of course, unique characteristics of this auction may limit the generality of our
analysis.
 Analysis of Transactions at a Recent HUD Home Auction
For each property sold at the auction, the auction price was recorded in a database,
along with the location of the property (address, city, county), number of
bedrooms, number of bathrooms, whether the property was constructed prior to
1978, ﬂood zone status, and whether the property is eligible for FHA-insured
ﬁnancing.1 Descriptive statistics for the data are shown in Exhibit 1.
Detecting whether auction prices are systematically higher or lower than the price
that would result in a non-auction situation requires an accurate estimate of the
price each property would bring in an alternative market mechanism. One possible
proxy of market value that is readily available is the assessed value of the property
as determined by the local property assessor. Using assessed value as a proxy for
market value, however, raises several important concerns.
First, assessments are performed annually and may not accurately represent the
value of the property on the date of the auction due to changes in market
conditions or changes in the condition of the property. Second, there may be a
tendency among assessment ofﬁcers to make ‘‘conservative’’ estimates of value to
reduce assessment appeals. Third, as Goolsby (1997) ﬁnds for owner-occupied
homes in various counties in the state of Washington, the use of standardized
adjustment premiums and discounts for certain property features by assessors may
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Control Sample Assessment Ratio (%) 82.4 95.1 79.4 78.7
Control Sample Size 2,016 1,463 1,204 738
Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
To address these concerns, we obtain predicted market value from assessed value
for each property, i, by dividing that property’s assessed value by the mean
assessment ratio for the property class.3 Exhibit 2 provides summary statistics for
the data used to calculate the mean county assessment ratios. The mean assessment
ratios for sales during the month preceding the auction for Broward County,
Miami-Dade County, Palm Beach County and West Coast counties are 82.4%,
95.1%, 79.4% and 78.7%, respectively.
Based on the data provided in Exhibits 1 and 2, prices observed at the auction
for the full sample are 17.45% less than predicted market values, on average.
Dividing the full sample into geographic subsamples reveals that the discount from
market value ranges from a high of 34.21% for properties on the West Coast to
only 13.45% for properties located in Miami-Dade County. Sales that occurred on
the ﬁrst day of the auction exhibit an implied discount from market value of
18.97%, while sales that occurred on the second day of the auction exhibit a
discount of 15.97%.
Difference in Means Tests
The descriptive statistics suggest that auction prices are consistently below
predicted market values, though the magnitude of the differences varies across
subsamples. A paired t-test permits testing for systematic differences between
auction prices and predicted market values.4
The results of applying this test to the mean of the difference between auction
prices and market values for the various subsamples are shown in Exhibit 3. The
results indicate that the mean differences between auction price and market value
for the full sample and all subsamples are signiﬁcantly different than zero. These
results suggest that auction prices examined in this study are systematically lower
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Exhibit 4  Results from Pooled t-tests Applied to Auction Data to Detect Signiﬁcant Differences between















t-Statistic for Differences in
Discounts Relative to Predicted
Market Value across Subsamples
0.47 2.68* 1.11 8.30* 1.14
*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level or higher.
Comparisons across the various subsamples may also provide insight regarding
potentially systematic differences between auction prices and market values.
Speciﬁcally, we are interested in whether the difference between auction price and
market value from one subsample differs from the difference between auction
price and market value from certain other subsamples. Such comparisons require
a pooled t-test rather than a paired t-test because the samples are drawn from
different populations.5
The results of applying this test statistic to the means of the differences between
auction prices and market values for various combinations of the subsamples are
shown in Exhibit 4. The tests suggest that auctioned properties located in Miami-
Dade County sold at signiﬁcantly smaller discounts and those on the West Coast
of the state sold at signiﬁcantly greater discounts than properties in the other
subsamples considered.
There are at least two possible explanations for the differences in the discounts
by subsample. First, because county assessors are elected ofﬁcials in Florida, they
are subject to inﬂuence by their constituents. Consequently, assessment ratios vary
by county, which should lead to differences in discounts by subsample. A second
potential source of the differences by subsample is differences in demand.
Although this auction occurred in a robust economy, there may have been some
difference in the level of economic activity by region. If this were the case, then
the results could be affected by these differences, consistent with Mayer (1994,
1998).
Testing for a Relationship Between Auction Order and
Price
To further investigate the microstructure of the price formation process, we employ
a framework similar to that used by Lusht (1994) in his investigation of Australian
branch bank auction prices. The objective of this portion of the analysis is to test288  Allen and Swisher
the null hypothesis of no impact on transaction prices as a result of the order in
which properties are offered at the auction, holding property quality constant. We
estimate the following equations:
Y  ƒ(Order, Assessed, Escrow, County ), ii i i i ,j (1)
i  1 ,...,nj  1 ,...,m
Y  ƒ(Order, PMV, Escrow, County ), ii i i i ,j (2)
i  1 ,...,nj  1 ,...,m
where:
Yi  Auction price for the ith property;
Orderi  Order of auction; the ﬁrst property to sell  1, the second  2, etc.;
Assessedi  Assessed value of the ith property;
PMVi  Predicted market value of the ith property;
Escrowi  Escrow for anticipated repairs; and
Countyi,j  Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, West Coast; dummy variables equal to one
for the location of the ith property, zero otherwise.
Assessed value is included in the speciﬁcation shown in Equation (1) and predicted
market value is included in the speciﬁcation shown in Equation (2) to control for
variation in property quality in the way Lusht used the seller’s reported ‘‘reserve
price’’ to address quality differences. We also control for the availability of an
escrow account to cover anticipated repairs. Systematic differences by county are
addressed through the use of county dummy variables, with Broward as the
omitted county. We estimate an additional equation with alternative proxy
variables to control for quality differences across the auctioned properties. This
equation is:
Y  ƒ(Order, Bed, Bath, LBP, FZ, Insurable, Escrow, ii i i i i i i
County ), i  1 ,...,nj  1 ,...,m i,j (3)
where:
Yi  Auction price for the ith property;
Orderi  Order of auction;
Bedi  Number of bedrooms;
Bathi  Number of bathrooms;
LBPi  Possibility of lead-based paint hazard (construction prior to 1978);Price Formation Process at a HUD Auction  289
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FZi  Whether the property lies in a ﬂood zone;
Insurablei  Whether the FHA-insured ﬁnancing is available on the property;
Escrowi  The amount of escrow fund for anticipated repairs;
Countyi,j  Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, West Coast; dummy variables equal to
one for the location of the ith property, zero otherwise.
We ﬁt each of these equations using ordinary least squares to the full sample of
transactions and to subsamples containing properties auctioned on the ﬁrst and
second days of the auction. The results are shown in Exhibits 5 and 6.
As shown in Exhibit 5, estimates of the parameters of Equations (1) and (2) with
the full sample of transactions indicate that auction prices are positively and
signiﬁcantly related to order of sale, controlling for property quality and for
differences by county. To demonstrate the economic signiﬁcance of the results,
consider the following example. For the twenty-ﬁfth property auctioned, a
Broward County house with two bedrooms, two baths, and an assessed value of
$66,470, the estimated coefﬁcient for order in Equation (1) implies a positive
effect on transaction price of $3,654. Thus, order of sale is signiﬁcant both
statistically and economically.6 The results for Equation (3) in Exhibit 5, however,
fail to support the signiﬁcance of order of sale when more detailed control
variables are used. Examination of the adjusted R2 and F-Statistics for the three
equations shows that the variation in the auction prices is better explained by
Equations (1) and (2) than by Equation (3), which includes more detailed control
variables.
Exhibit 6 shows order of sale is signiﬁcantly related to auction price on the ﬁrst
day of the auction in Equations (1) and (2), but order of sale is not signiﬁcant in
any speciﬁcation for the sample of transactions occurring on the second day of
the auction.
The signiﬁcance of escrow on auction prices in Exhibits 5 and 6 is also of interest.7
Estimates of the parameters in Equations (1) and (2) with the full sample and with
the subsample for the ﬁrst day of the auction indicate that buyers are willing to
pay a premium for properties offering escrow accounts to cover anticipated repairs.
For the full sample, the estimated coefﬁcient indicates that the transaction price
is increased by nearly the full amount of the escrow account.
Testing for a Relationship Between Auction Order and
Discount Relative to Market Value
The previous section tests whether prices are affected by order of sale for the
various subsamples, but does not directly address whether the difference between
market value and auction price is impacted by order of sale. To consider whether
the discount (or premium) relative to predicted market value is related to order of
sale, we estimate the following equations:290  Allen and Swisher
Exhibit 5  Testing the Full Sample for the Impact of Sequential Order on







Intercept 804.39 517.67 29,983.00**
(3,309.87) (3,290.55) (9,119.45)
Order 146.15** 146.83** 157.10
(60.40) (60.32) (124.87)
Assessed Value 0.93** 
(0.04)












Escrow 0.97** 0.96** 0.05
(0.40) (0.40) (1.39)
Miami-Dade 8,175.11 8,593.59* 13,463.00
(5,119.81) (5,117.74) (9,930.29)
Palm Beach 6,257.54** 7,678.04** 14,281.00**
(2,778.54) (2,735.47) (7,264.70)
West Coast 16,332.00** 17,096.00** 39,000.00**
(2,980.34) (2,968.19) (6,510.39)
Adj. R2 (%) 82.63 82.71 24.24
F-Statistic 104.04** 104.66** 5.16**
Number 131 131 131
Notes: The dependent variable is auction price. The standard errors of the coefﬁcients are in
parentheses and have been corrected for heteroskedasticity following White (1980).
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level or higher.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level or higher.Price Formation Process at a HUD Auction  291
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Discount  ƒ(Order, Escrow, County ) ii i i ,j (4)
i  1 ,...,nj  1 ,...,m
Discount  ƒ(Order, Bed, Bath, LBP, FZ, Insurable, ii i i i i i
Escrow, County ), i  1 ,...,n ii ,j
j  1 ,...,m (5)
where:
Discounti  Auction Pricei  Predicted Market Valuei/Predicted Market Valuei;
and
Escrowi  Escrowi/Predicted Market Valuei.
Again, we ﬁt each of these equations using ordinary least squares to the full
sample of transactions and to two subsamples containing properties auctioned on
the ﬁrst and second days of the auction. The results are shown in Exhibit 7.
The estimates of the parameters of Equation (4) and Equation (5) indicate that
the discounts relative to predicted market value are positively and signiﬁcantly
related to order of sale, with the exception of the estimate for Equation (4) for
the day two subsample. For the full sample, both speciﬁcations indicate that the
premium is greater for properties that include an escrow account for anticipated
repairs. With the sample of transactions occurring on day one, escrow is positively
related to the discount in Equation (4), but in the alternative model, escrow is no
longer signiﬁcant. For the second day of the auction, escrow is signiﬁcant in
Equation (5), but not in Equation (4).
 Conclusion
The perception that auctions present buyers with extraordinary opportunities to
acquire assets at deep discounts to value may be fueled by the notion that assets
are placed on the auction block when their current owners face an urgent need to
dispose of the assets regardless of price. The results demonstrate that auction
prices are persistently below predicted market values, though there is some
variation in the magnitude of the discount across geographic subsamples. Although
the purpose of HUD auctions is to dispose of property in a timely manner, it
cannot be assumed that they coincide with distressed markets. This auction, held
on July 10 and 11, 1998, takes place in a robust economy, both nationally and
locally.
This study reviews the procedural aspects of auctions held to rid HUD of
properties acquired as a result of borrower defaults on FHA-insured home296  Allen and Swisher
mortgages. Using data from transactions at a recent such auction held in south
Florida, we consider whether prices observed at the auction differ signiﬁcantly
from predicted market values. Taking a closer look at the price formation process,
we also test the data to consider whether auction prices are related to the order
in which properties at the auction were offered for sale.
The results indicate that prices observed at this auction are signiﬁcantly lower
than predicted market values, though the mean discount varies signiﬁcantly across
geographic subsamples. In particular, properties located in Miami-Dade County
sold for signiﬁcantly smaller discounts from predicted market value and those
located on the West Coast sold for signiﬁcantly greater discounts than those in
the other subsamples.
The order in which the properties were sold at auction is positively and
signiﬁcantly related to auction prices, suggesting that those who purchased
properties later in the auction were more likely to pay a higher price relative to
market value than those who purchased earlier in the auction. The indicated price
increase as the auction proceeds stands in contrast to Lusht’s (1994) ﬁndings of
an inverse relationship between prices and order of sale and De Boer, Conrad and
McNamara (1992) and Mayer’s (1998) ﬁndings of no price effect associated with
order of sale.
Although it is possible that these results could be attributed to an omitted variable
such as an ordering strategy on the part of the auctioneer, our analyses failed to
ﬁnd evidence of any such variable. Other variables that could inﬂuence the auction
price include whether the closing date occurs within ﬁfteen days of the auction,
whether the purchaser uses FHA-insured ﬁnancing and whether the purchaser was
an investor or owner/occupant. These variables, however, are unavailable to the
authors. In addition, the magnitude of any impact is expected to be economically
small.
We hesitantly suggest that the positive relationship between price and order of
sale might be attributable to increased aggression on the part of buyers who went
through the hassle of preparing to bid at the auction, but began to get nervous as
the inventory of properties on the block grew smaller as the auction proceeded.
Perhaps, in the spirit of Mayer (1994, 1998), the relation between demand and
supply at the auction for a speciﬁc subsample inﬂuenced the level of aggression
on the part of buyers. When we divide our full sample into day one and day two
subsamples, we ﬁnd evidence that order of sale is also positively related to price
in the day one subsample, but ﬁnd no evidence suggesting that buying later in the
second day of the auction results in any signiﬁcant price effect. Overall, the results
of the analysis presented here suggest that the ‘‘best’’ deals were enjoyed by those
who bought early in the auction.
 Endnotes
1 Some 290 properties were advertised for sale at the auction, but a substantial number of
them were withdrawn from the auction for undisclosed reasons prior to the sale date. Of
the 170 properties sold at the auction, 39 were eliminated due to incomplete data records.Price Formation Process at a HUD Auction  297
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2 In his study of assessment error in the valuation of owner-occupied housing in
Washington, Goolsby’s (1997) proposes a more detailed method of correcting for
assessment bias than the method employed here. His method addresses speciﬁc property
features that may impact the direction and magnitude of assessor bias. Application of
Goolsby’s detailed method is the subject of an intended future research study by these
authors.
3 Predicted market value for property i is calculated as: PMVi  i  1, . . . n, where
AVi
E(AR)
AVi is the assessed value for the property i and E(AR) is the mean county assessment
ratio calculated using transaction prices and assessed values for a sample of single-family
homes that sold within the month prior to the auction in the same county as property i.
4 To test the null hypothesis of no difference between auction prices and market values,
we use the following statistic t  where d and s represent the mean and standard
d
s/n
deviation, respectively, of the difference between auction prices and market values, and
n is the number of pairs considered. The statistic is distributed as Student’s t with n 
1 degrees of freedom, and the null hypothesis is rejected when the statistic is greater
than the corresponding critical value from the t-table. This paired t-test assumes that the
population of the differences is normally distributed.
5 The following statistic permits testing of the null hypothesis of no difference between
auction prices and market values across subsamples: t  where S
2 
x  y
2 S (1/m  1/n)
In this test statistic, x and y represent the means of the
22 (m  1)S  (n  1)S xy .
(m  n  2)
differences between auction price and market value from the two subsamples being
compared, Sx and Sy represent the standard deviations of the differences from each
sample, and m and n represent the number of observations in each sample. The statistic
is distributed as Student’s t with n  m  2 degrees of freedom, and the null hypothesis
is rejected when the statistic is greater than the corresponding critical value from the t-
table. The pooled t-test assumes populations to be independent and identically distributed
with equal variances.
6 Sirmans, Diskin and Friday (1995) ﬁnd some evidence of a negative relation between
assessed value/market value ratios and the market values of properties. Tests indicate
that our results cannot be attributed to this relation. We thank an anonymous referee for
drawing our attention to this possibility.
7 We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion to consider the effect of the repair
escrow account.
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